State Obligations and Non-Compliance in the Ramsar System

Like many environmental treaties, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands contains clauses that are very general in tone and impose only weak obligations upon parties. Following certain opinion, it is even debatable whether norms drafted in such vague terms can create legal obligations in any proper sense. However, and in conformity with the pacta sunt servanda principle, the vagueness that may characterize treaty provisions does not change their legal nature or effects: a concept that is clear from the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. What should rather be asked, is whether said norms have been effective in protecting wetlands over the past four decades, or will be able to do so in the future. Over the years, there have been many important developments in environmental law. Notwithstanding this fact, the substantive norms of the Ramsar Convention - one of the more historical environmental treaties (1971) - have never be amended. In fact, contracting parties have preferred to align these norms with subsequent legal developments and most particularly, with the post-UNCED conceptual and legal framework, by means of 'dynamic' interpretation. However, while interpretation may be useful in an inter-temporal law perspective, it is not necessarily the best way to address problems which may arise from ageing treaties. In any case, the extent of state obligations under the Ramsar Convention could not be appreciated without also taking into account: a) the interplay between hard and soft law, and b) the non-compliance mechanism, in the Ramsar system. From this point of view, in the opinion of this author, one conclusion might be that (somewhat surprisingly): 1) the vagueness of obligations has disappeared, but their weakness remains unchanged; and 2) the Ramsar system's 'founding fathers' were more courageous in the past than they seem to be at present.