The Analysis of Explosion of Storage Plants Containing Display Pyrotechnics

Several relevant accidents involving fireworks storage, as the explosion occurred in Enschede (NL) in 2000 or in Denmark in 2004, have induced significant modification in the Seveso (2003/105/CE) and pyrotechnic Directives (2007/23/EC), which now include firework storage plants other than manufacturing installations as relevant risk industries. However, despite the large number of storage plants in Europe and worldwide, few and un-detailed guidelines for risk assessment of storage plants can be found in the open literature. The most essential references about the use and storage of fireworks are NFPA1124, NFPA1123, NFPA1126. These guidelines give several information on safety distances and recommendation for manipulation of explosives and fireworks whereas storage design and risk assessment guidelines are neglected, although NFPA1124 gives indication on separation distances among storage system containing large amount of explosives (up to 40,000 kg), and civilian building (minimum distance: 600 m), public highways (300 m), barricaded (50 m) and un-barricaded (100 m) storage container. Military standards (TM 5-855; TM 5-1300, TM 9-1300-214) are also scarcely useful for risk assessment when low-energy pyrotechnics (fireworks) are of concern. Eventually, the aim of this work is the assessment of risk in the storage plant of large amount of pyrotechnics or secondary explosives in underground and aboveground, either reinforced or low-strength structures, with specific reference to the pressure wave generated by the explosion.