Data di Pubblicazione:
2003
Abstract:
Testing equivalence is a powerful means for expressing the security properties of cryptographic
protocols, but its formal verification is a difficult task because of the quantification over contexts
on which it is based. Previous articles have provided insights into using theorem-proving for the
verification of testing equivalence of spi calculus specifications. This article addresses the same
verification problem, but uses a state exploration approach. The verification technique is based on
the definition of an environment-sensitive, labeled transition system representing a spi calculus
specification. Trace equivalence defined on such a transition system coincides with testing equivalence.
Symbolic techniques are used to keep the set of traces finite. If a difference in the traces of
two spi descriptions (typically a specification and the corresponding implementation of a protocol)
is found, it can be used to automatically build the spi calculus description of an intruder process
that can exploit the difference.
Tipologia CRIS:
01.01 Articolo in rivista
Keywords:
network security; Formal methods; Testing equivalence; Spi-calculus; Automatic analysis
Elenco autori:
Sisto, Riccardo; Durante, Luca; Valenzano, Adriano
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