Securing mobile unattended WSNs against a mobile adversary

One important factor complicating security inWireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is lack of inexpensive tamperresistant hardware in commodity sensors. Once an adversary compromises a sensor, all memory and forms of storage become exposed, along with all secrets. Thereafter, any cryptographic remedy ceases to be effective. Regaining sensor security after compromise (i.e., intrusion-resilience) is a formidable challenge. Prior approaches rely on either (1) the presence of an on-line trusted third party (sink), or (2) the availability of a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) on each sensor. Neither assumption is realistic in large-scale Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSNs) composed of low-cost commodity sensors. periodic visits by the sink.) Previous work has demonstrated that sensor collaboration is an effective, yet expensive, means of attaining intrusion-resilience in UWSNs. In this paper, we explore intrusion resilience in Mobile UWSNs in the presence of a powerful mobile